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the way the doctor makes the prese ntation ordinaril y tells the tale. Arney also
noted, "Th e NIH 'consensus-developing' T ask Force on Predictors of Hereditary
Disease or Congenital Defects reco mm ended against requiring prior comm itment
to abortion , but there is no m ech anism for enforcing their recommendation." He
also noted, quite accurately, that "th e incidence of severe depression follow ing
elective abort ion for ge netic reasons is so great" t h at "it may be more difficult to
deal with than either an abortion of 'co nvenience' or a stillbirth at term," or
perhaps "even more diffi cult than bearing and rearing a defective child." Arney
does an excelle n t job in summin g up the implicit agreement m ade between
modern obstetric ians and modern women. He writes, " The rul e, simply stated, is
that birth should occur withi n a flexible system of obstetrical alternatives in
which a woman's experiences can take prominence agai nst a b ackgro und of
obstetric al expertise and safety. Around this rule modern women and modern
obstetricians have begun a univocal discourse over childbirt h . They are ostensibly
engaged in a dialogue , but in the exchanges o nl y a single voice is h eard." Unfortunately, in livin g o u t this agreement, the patient and this doctor occasionally end
up in an adversary relationship. The au thor, by way of conclusion, gives a very
positive and accurate presentation of the benefit to both m oth er and baby of a
prepared childbirth (psychoprophylaxis) approach to delivery.
The reviewer was , perhaps , prejudiced from the start against the book. It is
written in the language of the intellectually elite. Like ecclesiastic langu age, it can
be difficult to read. It is discomforting to be driven to the dictionary to understand t he meaning of a passage, especially when the thought can be simply
expressed. Who needs to say "concatenation " when " linking together" says it all .
The reviewer would not pay the $25 price listed for this p ublication.
- William F. Colliton, Jr ., M.D .
Chairman, Department of OB/GYN
Holy Cross Hospital
Silver Spring, Maryland

A Theory 0/ Medical Ethics
Robert M. Veatch
Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1981 , xi + 387 pp., index.
This is undoubtedly an important book in medical ethics , both for moralists
working in bioethics and for those in the h ealth care professions. If only because
of the stature of its author, it is bound to be influen t ial, and with good reaso n .
For Veatch is a balanced an d thorough writer whose reputation in the field of
bioethics is largely deserved. Moreover, the book's topic is importa nt and the
project it represents is ambitious ; it is nothing less than an attempt to articulate a n
ethics for the medical professions fro m the ground up. Veatch seeks to articulate a
public ethics which will really provide guidance for the difficult decisions health
care professionals and others must make in the modern health care setting. Furt h ermore , the ra nge of topics discussed and Veatch 's device of focusing discussions by way of concrete bioethical dilemmas make the boo k valuable no matter
what one thinks of the success of Veatch 's proj ect.
In the first of the four parts of the book, Veatch surveys various traditions of
m edical and physician ethics. He discusses the Hippocratic an d Judeo-Christian
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tradit ions, modern secular medical ethics, and a variety of traditions outside the
Anglo-American West . The diversity of moral judgment among these traditions
and their inadequacy to provide clear guidance on the test case Veatch uses are
intended to show the need for a new medical ethics. The case is one in which a
woman , about to die and the sole support of her infant who suffered from a
malformed hip, asked for help from her physician in painlessly killing her child
- a course of action she regarded as the most loving thing to do in the circumstances. However, as Veatch himself admits, most of the traditions he considers
would regard this killing as seriously wrong - for different reasons, perhaps, and
not without straining or inconsistency on the part of some. So this example does
not serve Veatch's purpose as well as some other example might. Still, he shows
clearly e nough that there are real differences and disagreements among the various
established traditions of medical ethics, and thus a need for work on the founda tions of medical ethics.
The second part of the book contains Veatch's attempt to articulate a universal
foundation for medical ethics. This part of .the book has two sections: a
polemical, and a constructive. In the polemical section, he mounts a powerful
critique of the idea that medical ethics can be founded on professional ethics of
physicians. One reason for the inadequacy of such a foundation is the fact that
the questions of medical ethics are not simply questions for physicians but for
other h ealth care professionals, patients, arid for people in general. There is no
reason why the specialized knowledge or moral convictions unique to a profession
should have any moral force for these people - much less the mere fact that the
profession has reached a consensus on moral matters.
The constructive alternative proposed by Veatch is a complicated version of a
social contract approach to ethical theory. The appropriateness of t his approach is
suggested by the social a nd contractual nature of m edicine itself. Veatch 's theory
involves a threefold co ntract. The first is the basic contract which establishes
society and its morality. The second is the contract between the medical professions and society. The third is the contract between the health care pro fessional
and the patient. What the parties to these three contracts accept will be the set of
moral principles for m edical ethics.
Veatch notes that for some the contract is an epistemological device for discovering moral truth, but that for others it is a way of inventing a morality . He
thinks that this basic disagreement can be set aside, for if those who regard the
basic contract as a means for inventing a morality which serves tbe ir self-interest
are willing to take the moral point of view, the results of this approach will be the
same as when it is used by those who regard it as a way of discovering moral
truths which are somehow given. I think that Veatch 's judgment that this disagreement need not be settled is the basic mistake in his project, for it belies a willingness to sacrifice moral truth to the requirements of reaching a workable agreement. And the two conceptions of the role of the basic contract are not likely to
give the same results. For self-interest, conditioned only by the impartiality of t he
moral point of view, will provide for some limits on the social behavior of individuals and groups but not a limit that will significantly compromise self-interest. It
is true that any functioning group needs some morality and this involves some
appeal to impartiality, but if self-interest is the basic principle,. then the morality
developed will limit the range of the application of the principle of impartiality,
so as not to overly constrain the basic concern of self-interest. Only if impartiality
is taken as basic will the self-interest of the contractors be systematically constrained. But then, it seems to me, self-interest would no longer be basic; we
would have, instead, a morality based on at least one moral truth.
This objection is not a merely theoretical quibble, for it goes to the heart of
what Veatch is undertaking. He wants a medical ethics which is both rationally
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based a nd practically workable - something on which people can agree. But by
setting up the co nditions of the contract as h e does, Veatch allows t h e desire for
agreement to override the requirement for a sound moral basis. Thus, when in the
next part of the book Veatch seeks to articulate p rinciples, the self-interest of
some contractors is allowed to override other moral convictions, with the result
t hat the principl es agreed to are sometimes so general that they provide no real
moral guidance. They are compromises which may satisfy those who want a moral
framework within which to pursue their self-interest but hardly those who regard
more stringent norms to be a matter of moral truth.
This is not to say that Veatch 's attempt to develop princi ples in th e third
section of the book is without merit. Much of what he says there is helpful and, it
seems to me, correct. He develops principl es of contract-keeping, autonomy,
honesty, avoiding killing, and justice. He deve lops these principl es after showing
that the Hippocratic principle of benefice nc e and its modern utilitarian replacement cannot serve as principles of medical ethics. These criticisms are powerful
and do not de pend on what self-interested contractors might or might not accept.
Rather, the critiqu e is based on the reasons contractors might h ave fo r rejecting
these positions - reasons base d e ntirely on philosophical analysis.
The difficulty in this third part of the book comes to the for e in the discussion
of the principle of avoiding killing. Veatch favors a very strong prohibition of
killing but recognizes that most would not accept it. He also criticizes, unpersuasively in my opinion, the double effect doctrine which provides reasonable
limits for the prohibition of killing. Thus, he leaves unsettled the basic moral
question of mercy killing which, he says, is as reasonabl e an exception as there
might b e to the prohibition against killing. Nevertheless, Veatch holds that medical professionals, because of their particular role, should not engage in it. In
discussing the definition of death , h e allows that the policy of regarding as dead
only those who have suffered complete destruc tion of brain function is merely
pragmatic and that moral standing should rather be determined by the capacity
for some sort of mental or social activity. On abortion, he simply declares that the
fetus lacks moral standing.
In short, the general pro-life principle Veatch embraces in fact has no cutting
edge. Since it seems that there is little prospect in the prese nt situation for
reaching any meaningful consensus on the life issues, the very general and tentative things V-eatch has to say on this provide no real guidance. It seems to me,
therefore, that in· this area one should not try to achieve a non-existent neutrality,
but rather make one's arguments as best one can, giving the best moral reasons
one has for what one thinks is truly right.
In the last part of the book, Veatch deals with the question of how t o apply
the various principles to actual cases - especially cases in .which the principles
conflict. The problem he faces is the problem of any ethical system with a plurality of independent principles. This problem, it see ms to me, is rationally insoluble.
It requires either an overriding principle for ordering the application of the substantive principles, or the use of intuition , decision , or some other non-rational
basis to decide which principle takes priority. It is not clear which of these
alternatives Veatch accepts , or even that he clearly faces the issue. What he does
say is that th ere is no general ordering principl e except the requirement that the
principle of be nefice nc e should give way to the other non-conse quenti alist principles he states, and that m ore specific m oral rules should be taken seriously but
not absolutely. However, the rules are derived from the principles and, like the
principles, are not tightly hierarchized. If there is an indexical order in the rules
- which there must be if they are to solve the problem - then one wond ers what
its source might be. It cannot be the principles for they are not ordered. So is it
intuition, practice, o r decision, whether individual or group? If it is, we may ask
what is rational a bout these things.
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This line of criticism is not meant to suggest that concrete decisions in medical
ethics are easily made. The problem is that we seem to have no articulable process
for rationally reaching them within the framework Veatch establishes. And w ithout such a process there is not, in principle, a way of arriving at a reasoned
consensus about the specific issues in medical ethics. Without the possibility of
such agreement, it is hard to see the value of agreement about general principles.
To resolve this difficulty, one must have a single basic principle, like the love
command of Christian ethics, or the principle of utility, or the Kantian principle
of respect for persons. Veatch correctly rejects the principle of utility, but does
not closely consider the other alternatives, perhaps because of the ambiguity of
the status of his contractors. Self-interested contractors would not accept either
the Christian or the Kantian principle. But this refusal shows only that the
demands of an agreeable conventional morality do not necessarily coincide with
the logical demands of a moral system which is based on moral truth and seeks to
give real guidance for difficult choices.
In short, this is an important and useful book, but it founders on the rocky
shoals of ethical theory because the author did no.t think hard enough about the
demands of the difficult task he undertook.
- Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.
University of St. Thomas
Houston, Texas

TWO VIEWS ON:

Moral Responsibility
in Pro Ionging Life Decisions
Donald G. McCarthy and Albert S. Moraczewski, Editors
Pope John Center, St. Louis, 1981 , xii + 316 pp. , $9.95.

I
Th e genesis of this work arose from papers prepared for three institutes for
health care professionals which were co-sponsored by the Catholic Health Association and the Pope John Medical-Moral Research and Education Center of St.
Louis. The volume is designed as an intra-Church project, has the Nihil Obstat and
Imprimatur, and carries out the mission of the Center namely, "applying Church
teaching to contemporary medical-moral issues. " This paradigm, ironically, contributes to both the strength and weaknesses of the work .
The book is divided into three sections. There are four essays on "Life and
Death"; eight on "Prolonging Life Decisions"; and the editors are completely
responsible for the final eight chapters on "Clinical and Pastoral Applications. "
The contributors represent the disciplines of theology, biblical studies, philosophy, law, sociology and medicine.
In general, the essays are critical of contemporary ethical trends, for most
respondents speak out of a natural law, deontological framework.
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